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RESUME 
 
The UCIPR, that regularly assesses political risks in Ukraine, states their degree of 6-7 points 
made by the ten-point scale. Within the assessment period (from June to October 2009), 
neither the degree nor the structure of political risks radically changed. Yet, in fall 2008 – 
spring 2009, major risks were characterized by the incomplete process of regrouping of political 
interests, whereas their structure was mostly determined by relations of enhanced political 
corruption.  
 
Grown on shadow agreements and exchange of resources to get or to strengthen power in the 
interests of individuals, relations of political corruption ruin principles of publicity and social 
trust in the process of power legitimation. Corruption and its political derivative weaken 
government institutions and generate a system of parallel governance that serves the purpose of 
increasing power in the interests of individuals. Political corruption increases in the absence of 
system reforms in different areas and, in its turn, postpones prospects for their implementation.  
 
Political corruption relations develop in a special way in the context of preparations for the 
presidential campaign. Corruption methods expected in its course include direct and indirect 
bribery of voters, the use of budget money and money from outside electoral funds of 
candidates, corruption of the media, the illegitimate use of law-enforcement structures, the 
forgery of documents and the illegal influence on court judgments. 
 
The destabilization of the work of parliament as the legislator is one of the main negative factors 
of the political development. It emerges as a result of the dominance of political interests over 
parliamentary procedures, incorrect administration of parliamentary procedures and their 
manipulation for private political purposes. Specifically, voting procedures and rules that forbid 
to simultaneously hold deputy mandates in the Verkhovna Rada and executive structures or to 
carry out any business activity need to be complied with. The illegal holding, by some 
politicians, of offices in different social production sectors creates unequal opportunities for 
other entities. The practice of blocking plenary sessions of the VR by MPs impedes the regular 
and effective legislative process (for this reason, none out of 24 plenary sessions has been held 
over 1 September – 7 October, 2009).  
 
The government assumes functions of “manual administration” because of the disorganization 
of the parliamentary business and the imbalanced legislative process. Given the understaffed 
composition of the government (3 vacant positions) and the process of preparing the national 
budget for 2010, such the state of procedures causes risks of unpredictability both for the 
implementation of some government policies and for the stability of the political system on the 
whole.  
 
A positive aspect, from the viewpoint of ensuring the political system stability within the 
monitoring period, is an end to efforts to change the political system and the system of power in 
a shadow manner. At the same time, a probability of changing the political regime by non-
transparent means remains among factors of political risks for the medium-term period (until 
January 2010), as electoral prospects of key presidential candidates will get more pronounced.  
 
Political corruption adversely affects both the political stability and the business climate, 
eroding principles of equal competition, in particular in the process of privatization of state 
property. Earlier on, privatization has been motivated by the government intention to ensure 
budget receipts, whereas as the elections approach, privatization units are viewed as means of 
exchange of resources with groups of influence. 
3 
UCIPR, Politics Division 
Document on Political Risk Assessment, Issue 3. October 2009  
POLITICAL CORRUPTION IN THE SYSTEM OF POLITICAL RISK ASSESSMENT  
 
In the context of assessment of political risks and expectations concerning the stability of the political 
process, of special note are relations that lie outside the area of public policy but nevertheless 
substantially determine decision-making.  
Political corruption as relations built on non-public satisfaction of private political interests has a 
number of threats to democracy and effective governance. The most serious among them are a blow to 
the trust in political and governmental institutions and their actions. According to American researcher 
James Jakobs,1 born inside the political system, in the core of the state, political corruption 
launches identical mechanisms at other levels and legitimates permissiveness. In his 
opinion, in developed democracies, a loss of the trust in fair and open politics and the absence of the 
trust in politicians and parties erode the fundamentals of democracy and the legitimacy of its 
institutions, whereas in transitional societies, political corruption threatens vitality of democracy and 
makes new democratic institutions weak and ineffective. In developed and transitional democracies, 
political corruption entails separation between the state and the society and enhances anomie in the 
society2. 
Political corruption impedes equal access to justice, the right to take part in the political life and to 
exercise other civil rights. It hampers the democratic development and serves as a major barrier to 
transparency in the political and social life. In the long run, regular political corruption, as a means of 
“spoiling” the established decision-making procedures, as a means of conducting uncompetitive policy 
through broad clientele networks and weakening the trust in governmental institutions and their 
capacities, creates grounds for an authoritarian political regime. Power institutions find themselves 
outside the established procedures and have low chances to perform their functions. Hence, political 
corruption shall be recognized a fundamental obstacle to the development of social and 
political relations in Ukraine on principles of the democratic delegation of power and the 
fulfillment, by the state (by its institutions and officials), of regulatory functions. 
The term “political corruption” is not defined in the Ukrainian law because political corruption is a 
motive, which is difficult to formalize. Only the term “corruption” is legally determined. In the law “On 
Principles of Preventing and Combating Corruption” of 11 June, 20093, corruption is defined in the 
sense of abuse of office or authority by officials for the purpose of getting illegitimate benefits or 
receiving promises/proposals of such benefits for themselves or other persons or, respectively, 
promises/proposals or granting illegitimate benefits to such persons or, on their request, other natural 
persons or legal entities so that to incline them to illegal actions due to abuse of office or authority. This 
definition lies in the context of the approach of the UN General Assembly, under which corruption 
should be understood to encompass the commission or omission of an act in the performance of or in 
connection with one's duties, in response to gifts, promises or incentives demanded or accepted, or the 
wrongful receipt of these once the act has been committed or omitted4. 
In political science, the term “political corruption” marks abuse of authority for illegal private 
(personal or particular) economic and/or political purposes. From the author’s viewpoint, the key 
motivation goal of political corruption relations is the possession of power resource, which is actually a 
difference between political and economic corruption.  
                                                            
1 Jakobs J. B. Dilemmas of Corruption Control // Political Corruption in Transition. A Skeptics Handbook/ Ed.: by Kotkin S., 
Sajo A. – Budapest, 2002. – P. 83. 
2 The same source 
3 The law “On Principles of Preventing and Combating Corruption” of 11 June, 2009 will come in effect from 1 January, 2010 
onwards. It was approved instead of the law “On Combating Corruption” of 5 October, 1995 
4The Code of Conduct for Law-Enforcement Officials, the UN General Assembly resolution 34/169 of 17 December, 1979 
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The matter concerns the application of corruption technologies to attain political goals: the usurpation of 
power, strengthening of it etc. Considering this as a period of corruption practice, the author would like 
to state corruption in politics is not limited exclusively to this stage but spreads to the whole political 
process.  
Not only state officials but also all agents, who are engaged in politics and possess (dispose) an 
exchangeable resource, are bearers of political corruption relations. Figuratively, political corruption 
relations resulting in the receipt of the so-called corruption rent can be expressed with the power-
property-power formula. In other words, political corruption means the receipt of not economic 
(material or monetary) profit but a special kind of dividends, political ones; it does not resolve issues of 
the business development but enhances one’s positions in politics. Proceeding from the definition for 
“illegitimate benefit” given in the law “On Principles of Preventing and Combating Corruption” of 11 
June, 20095, it is possible to say relations of political corruption are built on illegitimate and illegally 
gained political (power) benefit.  
The author uses the term “political corruption” to characterize relations of illegitimate 
(illegal) exchange of resources with groups of influence to increase private power 
influence, which erodes democratic procedures and institutions and damages the social 
interest.  
Political corruption seriously threatens democracy since it ruins the trust as the key 
element of power legitimation. As a rule, such relations emerge between those, who own (or, in case 
of government officials, dispose) any resource that could be exchanged for another resource ensuring the 
political support. Despite approaches of many researchers to political corruption are based on the 
understanding of subjects of corruption offences as public figures (e.g., according to Joseph 
LaPolambara, political corruption is any act performed by officials, when departing from their legal 
obligations in exchange for personal advantages6), the author thinks mechanisms of political corruption 
could be applied not only by officials but also by any other persons striving for political advantage gained 
by means of illegitimate exchange. For instance, the mechanism of bribery of voters, which by nature is 
the illegitimate exchange of an economic resource of a candidate for a political benefit (votes), is not 
necessarily implemented by officials. Such a person, even if he/she does not represent the government, 
becomes an agent of politics by virtue of personal aspirations to get power. Hence, the subject of actions 
linked to political corruption should be understood as everyone, who gets power by illegal means or 
encourages this by giving personal resources in the support of such actions in exchange for desirable 
favors/benefits.  
As it has been mentioned above, political corruption is not abuse of power by political leaders in order to 
get personal benefits to increase influence or wealth. Political corruption does not necessarily mean 
financial quotas; it can take a form of trade in influence or granting of special privileges in exchange for 
favors to enhance political (power) positions. Political corruption covers a vast circle of crimes and 
offences committed by politicians not only in and after the exercise of office but also in the process of 
getting it. Researchers make a special emphasis on the fact that political corruption differs from 
corruption offences of ordinary bureaucrats, since it is committed by political leaders or elected officials 
vested with social powers and trust and bearing responsibility to the whole society for actions pertaining 
to the national interest7. Hence, relations of political corruption eventually ruin national interests. 
                                                            
5 The term “illegitimate benefit” in the law “On Principles of Preventing and Combating Corruption” of 11 June, 2009 means 
funds or other property, advantages, privileges and favors of material or non-material nature promised, offered, given or 
received for free or for the price lower than the minimum market value without any legal grounds 
6 Sajo A. Introduction. // Political Corruption in Transition. A Skeptics Handbook. Ed.: by Kotkin S., Sajo A. – Budapest, 2002. 
Р. 3 
7According to American scientist Mark Philip, criteria of political corruption are as follows: it is committed by state officials and 
violates the trust of citizens who delegated them powers; it is committed in a manner that hampers social and national interests 
for the sake of personal interests, which runs counter to the officially declared  and legally set goals; state officials act in the 
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According to the definition of American political scientist Harold D. Lasswell, in the political sense, 
corruption is a violation of a common shared interest in favor of private privileges. That is 
to say, relations of political corruption do not mean a trivial offense, as the spread of corruption damages 
fundamentals of public policy and interests of the society that constitutionally declared principles of 
democracy, the legal and social state.  
In countries like Ukraine, where the development of public procedures is impeded and socio-political 
relations are built mostly on hidden ties, a specific feature of political corruption is its “legality”, when 
politicians use the absence of procedures, and “illegality”, when procedures are set but violated and 
ruined. The observation of Joseph LaPolambara that “in Eastern Europe, “corrupt” officials often do 
exactly what they would have done under the law anyway”8 stands true for Ukraine: weakness of 
governmental institutions and improper administration of government services create 
conditions for officials to “legally” abuse authority they are vested with under the law in 
their personal interests.  
Assessing whether political corruption in Ukraine is fundamental or attributive, one should 
pay attention to its systemic nature: relations of political corruption are based on clientele networks 
that emerged partly as the heritage of the Soviet nomenclature and partly as a phenomena of the new 
time characterized by the retention of groups of supporters by the private capital and the designation of 
representatives of these group (including the use of elements of nepotism) to public offices. The advent 
of the private capital to politics symbolized the transfer of the social clientele as the 
system of private paternalism to the political process, in particular to party-building and party 
activities (party politics). Clients of these networks, who owe their patrons the social (often career) 
growth, in due time pay them with loyalty and favors instead of complying with procedures of an 
institution they represent. This is pointed out by Hungarian scientist Andras Sajo, who views it as “a 
network of social relations, where personal loyalty to the patron prevails against the modern alternatives 
of market relations, democratic decision-making and professionalism in public bureaucracies.”9 
According to data of an expert survey on “Impact of Political Corruption on the Stability of the 
Political Process: Corruption Practices in the Election Process” being a part of this Document 
(enclosed), corruption relations affected to some extent all institutions of Ukraine’s 
political system (p. 2). None of respondents said "I have never heard about something like this” 
or “Corruption is not typical for political process in Ukraine and exists in other areas”. 100% of 
pollsters pointed out the political process in Ukraine is characterized by the purchase (sale, 
exchange) of decisions by a parliamentary faction, the purchase (sale, exchange) of offices in 
national executive authorities, the purchase (sale, exchange) of court judgments, the purchase 
(sale, exchange) of decisions of control bodies (taxation, sanitary and epidemiological, fire and 
other services), 96% of respondents are sure of the purchase (sale, exchange) of decisions by the 
government (ministries).  
In its turn, the clientele forms networks of influence and creates stable forms of involving the social 
support. It is based on unofficial ties, which allows authorities to substitute formal procedures with 
behind-the-scenes agreements. Hence, clientelism and political corruption are intergenerative 
and interdependent factors of social relations.  
The on-going delay of the administrative reform, which would separate the public service system from 
the system of political decision-making and set up professional public service, distorts the stable system 
of selecting public officials because of the dominance of client-patron relations. This ruins the system of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                
interests of a third party guaranteeing it access to services or resources, to which it could not access by other, legal means .// 
Philip M. Conceptualizing Political Corruption // Political corruption: concepts and context. – New Jersey, 2002. P. 41 
8 Sajo A. Introduction. // Political Corruption in Transition. A Skeptics Handbook. Ed.: by Kotkin S., Sajo A. – Budapest, 2002. 
Р. 3 
9 Sajo A. Introduction. // Political Corruption in Transition. A Skeptics Handbook. Ed.: by Kotkin S., Sajo A. – Budapest, 2002. 
Р. 3 
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professional public service and enhances influences of politicians authorized to carry out personnel 
policy in national authorities. 
Summarizing the above, it is possible to conclude that relations of political corruption are typical for 
countries that failed to pass reforms necessary for democratic governance and social relations. In such 
countries, the dependence of political decision-making on the illegal receipt of personal political benefits 
to the detriment of social interests is growing. The clientele and its “daughter”, political corruption, are 
as much dangerous as these phenomena are close to those responsible for political and administrative 
decision-making and as power institutions are ruined due to their increasing dominance.  
The duration of the application of corruption methods is determined by the extremely 
high level of their efficiency. Some 48% of experts polled by the UCIPR are sure it is impossible to 
completely eradicate political corruption as this phenomenon is typical for all societies, including 
democratic ones (see materials of the expert survey on “Impact of Political Corruption…”, p. 9). Yet, it is 
the systemic nature of corruption practices that bears all the risks up to the destruction of government 
institutions. Besides, in developed democracies, an important anti-corruption measure is, 
together with mechanisms of institutional and legislative control, the so-called zero 
tolerance, according to which the higher office an official holds, the more severe is a social 
assessment of his/her actions10, whereas in underdeveloped societies, including Ukraine, the 
situation is often the opposite: the society justifies corruption offenses of top officials and high-ranking 
politicians and blames less influential persons for less socially dangerous illegal actions. This proves and 
confirms specificities of paternalistic social relations in Ukraine, under which citizens treat officials not 
as performers of delegated functions on whom their life success depends, but as a show played by strange 
figures with the different degree of attractiveness.  
Traditions of clientele networks in the political and administrative process can be 
eliminated exclusively by a shift to system reforms, which will allow changing the basis of 
socio-political relations with the launch of the political process at the stage of elections, 
recruiting of political and administrative elites. The performance of functions by the 
government should be maximally regulated and transparent. It is necessary to carry out 
the administrative reform, which will help separate the political (fight for power) and 
administrative processes, strengthen the system of public service, set up a system of 
independent courts and ensure the maximum compliance with the rule of law.  
                                                            
10 Jakobs J.B. Dilemmas of Corruption Control. P. 84 
7 
UCIPR, Politics Division 
Document on Political Risk Assessment, Issue 3. October 2009  
POLITICAL CORRUPTION IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 
Assessing the level of corruption of the upcoming presidential campaign, experts are not 
inclined to believe it will be higher than the previous ones.  
Only ¼ of polled experts (25%) expect surges of corruption during the elections. Most 
respondents (80%) stress the presidential campaign of 1999 was the most corrupt. It was followed 
by the 2007 (special) parliamentary elections (60%) and the 2006 elections to parliament and 
local councils (48%) (see materials of the expert survey on “Impact of Political Corruption…”, p. 
3).  
Hence, the author thinks the clientelistic nature of socio-political relations and the party 
system backed by interests of those, who illegally gained offices in the system of power, 
necessarily determine the application of corruption techniques in the electoral process.  
The simplest and the most famous form of political corruption is the “purchase of votes” spread in 
electoral campaigns at the local and national levels. A type of political system and its level make seekers 
of power only change this form, not deny it.  
 
According to expert assessments, main expected types of corruption offences incorporate:  
? Direct and indirect bribery of voters  
? Administrative interference with elections  
? Illegal influence on court judgments  
? Use of budget (public) funds 
? Forgery of documents  
? Illegitimate exchange of resources with groups of influence for personal advantages  
? Abuse of authority of law-enforcement structures  
? Bribery of the media’s influence on the information space   
Respondents guess political forces will apply varieties of the above techniques in the extent to which they 
have access to resources of influence and exchange: the more branched a party’s clientele 
network is and the more tools of influence a political force has, the more opportunities it 
will have for political corruption and vice versa. In this context, Donatella Della Porta and 
Alberto Vanucci correctly observed, “Corrupt politicians are said to be very skilled in networking, 
building up circles of loyal supporters, to whom they distribute favors (or even just promises of favors).”11 
“Moreover, the actors in the corrupt exchange need “cover-ups”; in other words, they must minimize the 
likelihood of being reported and investigated. With either threats or favors, the corrupt politicians must 
erect a wall of silence around their illicit dealings. This can be done by corrupting judges ad/or the local 
press. This is how corrupt networks are formed.”12  
In the upcoming elections, the horizon of corruption networks could be even “successfully” expanded due 
to the impact on activities of members of district electoral commissions. The media reported 
                                                            
11 Della Porta D., Vanucci A. A Typology of Corrupt Networks // Comparing Political Corruption and Clientism. Ed. Kawata J. – 
Ashgate, 2006. P. 26 
12 Della Porta D., Vanucci A. A Typology of Corrupt Networks // Comparing Political Corruption and Clientism. Ed. Kawata J. – 
Ashgate, 2006. P. 27 – 30  
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some political forces offer the “motivation approach” to members of district electoral commissions, who 
will “favor” a victory of their candidate: they will be included into lists of candidates to deputies of local 
(district and city) councils during elections in May 2010. As is known, the procedure for the setting up of 
district electoral commissions at presidential elections in each of 225 territorial constituencies provides 
for the submission of candidatures (by two persons to every electoral commission from a candidate) by 
presidential candidates registered in the Central Electoral Commission (Article 23 of the law “On 
Elections of the President of Ukraine” in the redaction of 10 September, 2009). Such motivation can 
apparently urge some members of district electoral commissions to illegal actions: by satisfying private 
(corporate, personal) interests, political corruption erodes legitimate procedures.  
The so-called technical candidates, whose number will vary, will have opportunities to affect the work of 
district commissions. The use of potential of representatives of such candidates in district electoral 
commissions in the second round remains open as well.  
Corruption influences often determine activities of the media, whose owners take part in the 
formation of corruption “rent” in favor of a certain candidate. It is a widespread phenomenon in the 
national or municipal media to use media opportunities in favor of a political force represented by the 
leadership of the media founder.  
Of special note are illicit influences on the law-enforcement system, the court system and judges involved 
in the resolution of election disputes in view of possible lobbying of political interests in their verdicts for 
different reasons. 
There is a high possibility that corrupt influences will play the essential role in the presidential elections. 
Though, unlike the 1999 campaign, which experts deem to be the most corrupt and in which the resource 
was concentrated mostly in the interests of the Head of State, the 2010 elections will be marked with the 
completion of clienteles. The question is whose clientele will prove to be the most branched, the most 
ready-witted and the strongest. Taking into account the general dependence of the party activity upon 
shadow influences, such mechanisms as bribery of voters, illegal influence on court judgments and 
bribery of the media’s influence on the information space will be used by political forces that do not 
actively participate in decision-making in the Verkhovna Rada today.  
 
 
9 
UCIPR, Politics Division 
Document on Political Risk Assessment, Issue 3. October 2009  
PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF DECISION-MAKING IN PARLIAMENT WITH RISKS OF 
INSTABILITY OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS  
 
 
Among factors of influence on the political development of special note are the dominance of political 
corporate interests over parliamentary procedures and their insufficient regulation, which, in the long 
run, destabilizes the work of parliament as the legislator.  
 
According to polled experts (see materials of the expert survey on “Impact of Political Corruption…”, 
pp. 4-5), corruption motivation can to a certain extent be traced in actions of some factions and 
groups represented in Ukrainian parliament. Political forces that have opportunities for illegal 
exchange, access to resources and election position so strong that the loss of reputation will not 
threaten the electoral success have more corruption motivations. If trade in influence seriously 
tarnishes the political reputation of members of such forces, they are threatened with the loss of 
political subjectivity.  
In parliament, political corruption exists as trade in influence and manipulation of 
procedures. "Trade in influence” means favors or denial of personal political positioning in the 
electoral field in exchange for privileges of lobbying economically or politically beneficial decisions. 
Manipulation of procedures is also used to meet political interests. It is even easier to do because of the 
absence of a proper legal form of a regulatory document, the Regulations of the Verkhovna Rada, which 
establishes the organization and procedures for parliamentary business.  
 
The principle of the rule of law in the system of normative and legal acts is entrenched in the 
Constitution of Ukraine. Article 92 lists the most important social relations that shall be regulated 
exclusively by laws of Ukraine, including “the organization and operational procedure of the 
Verkhovna Rada”. This was addressed by the judgment of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine of 1 
April, 2008. Meanwhile, after the loss of validity of the 16 March, 2006 parliamentary resolution 
annexed with the Verkhovna Rada Regulations and the loss of validity of the Temporary 
regulations of the Verkhovna Rada (approved by the 8 April, 2008 parliamentary resolution “On 
Some Aspects of Normative and Legal Regulation of the Work of the Verkhovna Rada of 
Ukraine”) under the verdict of the Constitutional Court of 17 September, 2008, on 19 September, 
2008, the VR passed a legally uncertain document, the Regulations of the Verkhovna Rada.  
 
The absence of a proper legal form of the Regulations, which, as is governed by their Article 1 “set the 
procedure for the preparation and holding of sessions of the Verkhovna Rada, its meetings, the 
formation of national authorities; established the law-making procedure, the procedure for consideration 
of other issues within its competence and the procedure for the exercise of controlling functions of the 
Verkhovna Rada”, creates additional difficulties in the organization of the work of parliament. 
Specifically, voting procedures set by the above Regulations are violated. Under the Regulations, “MPs 
shall vote personally by the electronic system in the VR session hall or in the place designed for secret 
voting near the hall for plenary sessions” (Article 47), whereas the procedure for voting by the electronic 
system is substituted with voting by raising hands. The resolution “On Changing the Method for Voting 
on Bills Pertaining to the Increase of Social Standards” endorsed on 22 September, 2009 on the 
Speaker’s initiative ruled, “At sessions of the Verkhovna Rada, MPs shall vote on bills (registration No. 
4762, 5062, 5091-1, 5091-2 and 5091-3) according to results of their discussion personally by raising 
hands. The Speaker shall read name, second name and patronymic name of every MP in the alphabetic 
order. Every MP, whose name was uttered, shall raise his/her hand and say his/her will “for” to the 
microphone. If he/she votes “against” or abstains, he/she shall say a respective will without raising 
his/her hand. The Count Committee shall count voices and inform the Verkhovna Rada about outcomes 
of voting on every bill.” On 6 October, this resolution was recognized invalid. Needleless to say, should 
the Regulations be a document of higher legal force, such situations with the approval of special single 
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procedures and their further abolition would be avoided thereby ensuring the stability of parliamentary 
procedures.  
 
Procedures for the acquisition and resignation of deputy powers are often violated, which serves as a 
reason for the combination of executive and business offices by MPs prohibited by the Constitution: 
under Article 78 of the Basic Law, “MPs shall not have any other representative mandate, be in the civil 
service, hold any other paid offices, carry out gainful or business activity (with the exception of teaching, 
scientific and creative activities) or be members of the administration/governing body of a profit-making 
enterprise or organization.” The declaration of the verdict by the Constitutional Court of Ukraine of 29 
January, 2008 reads, “The essence of the settlement of disputes concerning the simultaneous holding of 
offices, the requirement to ban which is determined by the nature of respective representation, is the 
renouncement of deputy powers.”  
 
As of now, at least 6 MPs combine offices (3 from the BYuT faction, 1 from OUPSD and 2 from Lytvyn 
Block). Withdrawal of deputy mandates of these persons has been delayed for different periods though 
Article 78 of the Constitution of Ukraine reads, “Where there emerge circumstances preventing the MP 
from fulfilling a requirement concerning incompatibility of the deputy’s mandate with other types of 
activity, the MP shall, within twenty days from the date of the emergence of such circumstances, 
withdraw from the business concerned or personally apply for the resignation of deputy powers.” Article 
81 also clearly governs, “Powers of the MP shall terminate prior to the expiration of his/her term in office 
in the event of <…> «5) his/her failure, within twenty days from the date of the emergence of 
circumstances preventing him/her from fulfilling a requirement concerning incompatibility of the 
deputy’s mandate with other types of activity, to remove such circumstances.” Meanwhile, the Verkhovna 
Rada is not concerned with the simultaneous holding of office by some MP probably because their real 
number (especially in connection with business activities of MPs) is so high that if the letter and the 
spirit of the Constitution are complied with, parliament would not have a majority to make decisions 
because of mass resignations. Today, the implementation of procedures concerning the prohibition to 
combine offices is substituted with speculations on the expediency of their coming into effect.  
 
New wordings of the Constitution will probably set new rules on the simultaneous holding of offices and 
interpret types of activities anew. Specifically, the bill ‘”On Amending the Constitution of Ukraine” 
submitted for discussion by the President provides for the simultaneous holding of governmental and 
deputy offices (Article 90). Article 78 of the bill ‘”On Amending the Constitution of Ukraine” 
promulgated by the media this June as the document jointly drafted by the Party of Regions and BYuT 
also reads, “MPs shall have the right to hold ministerial offices in the Cabinet, such as the offices of the 
PM, First Vice PMs, Vice PMs and ministers. MPs may not hold any other representative mandate, be 
employed in the public service, hold other paid offices, carry out other paid or business activities (save 
the education, scientific and creative ones; the use and disposition of corporate rights in business 
associations) or be members of the leadership or advisory council of profit-making 
enterprises/organizations.” To avoid double interpretation, the PR and BYuT bill suggests 
supplementing Article 42 of the Constitution in force with the rule reading, “The ownership, use and 
disposition of corporate rights in business associations shall not pertain to business activities.” The above 
excerpts evidence politicians have not denied the idea of the simultaneous holding of 
executive and legislative offices though the expediency of such step is neither substantiated nor 
argued, especially in view of its correlation with other novelties. 
 
The tactics of blocking plenary sessions of the Verkhovna Rada by MPs impedes the stability of law-
making: none effective session has been held from 1 September (the beginning of the work of the 
Verkhovna Rada of the 6th convocation) to 7 October. Despite the Verkhovna Rada Regulations do not 
provide for the blocking of the parliamentary rostrum as a procedure of the parliamentary process, it is 
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rather often used by different political forces to attain their own goals, discrediting the efficiency of law- 
and decision-making. The latter provides for discussion and voting at plenary sessions for draft decisions 
– bills and resolutions submitted after their consideration in special parliamentary committees. Except 
for the destruction of procedural aspects, the blocking impedes consideration of draft decisions on their 
merits.  
 
Rules of the law on developing the legislation need to be strictly complied with. For instance, 
the notorious law “On Prohibition of Gambling” of 15 May, 2009 provided for the approval, within 3 
months, of a regulatory mechanism for gambling business, which radically changed business conditions 
in this area, but failed to list any compensation mechanism. Meanwhile, the negative social effect of 
gambling has not been eliminated as of now. The government lost a tax-payer and incomes from 
gambling moved into the shadow.  
 
Special attention shall be paid to lability of Ukraine’s legislation. The legislator substitutes the lack 
of reforms with the “flexible” application of rules of the law. Specifically, only in September 2005, a 
number of changes to the law “On Safety and Quality of Foodstuffs” were endorsed banning the sale of 
homemade dairy products and meat on foods markets, which is to come into effect on January 1, 2010 
(Article 35). Yet, over 5 years, the government has been failing to create conditions for the correct 
application of the above rule with regard to interests of different parties. In October-December 2009, the 
government is expected to pass a law postponing the effect of the rule until 1 January, 2015. As said by 
the Chairman of the State Committee for Entrepreneurship, if changes are not approved by the law, they 
will be regulated by the Cabinet resolution. At a meeting with the voters on 16 October, 2009, Speaker V. 
Lytvyn “explained” the above approach, “The World Trade Organization is said to protest. Though, I did 
not see anyone excluded from the WTO.”  
 
A positive aspect, from the viewpoint of ensuring the political system stability within the monitoring 
period (June-October 2009), is an end to efforts to change the political system and the system of power 
in a shadow manner like it happened in April-May 2009 in the form of shadow agreements of members 
of the ruling coalition and the opposition on amending the Constitution. At the same time, these 
activities might enhance in the pre-election period, when the regrouping of interests of groups of 
influence is clearer and electoral prospects of key presidential candidates get more pronounced. Hence, a 
possibility of changing the political regime by informal agreements remains among 
factors of political risks for the medium-term period (until January 2010). 
 
 
 
PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF DECISION-MAKING IN THE GOVERNMENT  
 
Positive aspects aimed to reduce risks of unpredictable decisions of Ukrainian authorities incorporate 
new rules of the government regulations that set procedures for holding sessions of the Cabinet, 
preparation and making of decisions and others. On 8 July, 2009, these rules were introduced to the 
valid Regulations of the Cabinet of Ministers of 18 July, 2007. Under new rules, plans of the preparation 
of government draft acts on the implementation of laws, presidential and parliamentary decrees shall be 
approved at the Cabinet sessions, whereas in practice, such documents are approved solely by either the 
Prime Minister or one of Vice Prime Ministers. Rules on the right of the government to abolish acts of 
local state administrations (which actually meant the excess of the legal competence of the government) 
and to pass government orders by polling the Cabinet members are deleted. Today, the right of the PM or 
the Vice PM to solely make decisions on the content and procedures governing activities of national 
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executive authorities are also deleted from the Regulations, which means the stabilization of decision-
making in the government.  
However, risks resulting from unpredictable actions of the government emerge due to the 
non-compliance with regulation procedures; therefore, their reduction partially depends 
on the proper administration of procedures. In this respect, according to the published data of 
the Presidential Secretariat (since an authorized representative of the Head of State has the right to take 
part in sessions of the Cabinet, the author can refer to this source), at sessions of the Cabinet within the 
initial six months of 2009, violations of the Regulations of the Cabinet then in force were as follows: 398 
decisions were made at sessions of government committees without preliminary consideration (32% of 
draft decisions considered at the Cabinet sessions); 297 decisions were made without the opinion of the 
Ministry of Justice (24 % of draft decisions considered at the Cabinet sessions); 78 decisions were made 
without or with partial consideration of the opinion of the Ministry of Justice on their non-compliance 
with legislative acts of higher legal force (6% of draft decisions considered at the Cabinet sessions); and 
178 decisions were made by voting (15 % of draft decisions considered at the Cabinet sessions).  
Moreover, the disorganization of the work of parliament and, as a result, the imbalance of 
the legislative process have long served as preconditions for the function of “manual 
administration” of the government. This factor gained a special meaning under the incomplete 
government, where the offices of the Minister of Defense and the Minister of Transport are vacant since 
June and the office of the Minister of Finance – since February 2009. These ministerial offices are 
decisive for the government policy with regard of the preparation of the national budget for 2010.  
 
The personnel policy of parliament and the government needs a higher level of 
transparency. With regard to the fact that draft resolutions on the dismissal of Minister of Housing 
and Communal Services O. Kucherenko, Minister of Health V. Knyazevych and Minister of Labor and 
Social Policy L. Denisova (in total – 10 persons), were registered in parliament as of 15 October, it is 
possible to state that these potentially vacant positions might create additional problems for 
the functioning of the government composed of 25 persons up to the absence of a quorum 
for decision-making.  
 
On 9 October, Speaker Lytvyn aid, “There are candidates for 2 Vice Prime Ministers and 2 ministers.” 
The matter concerned the support to candidates submitted by the government on 7 October, 2009. By a 
respective resolution, the Cabinet proposed parliament to appoint M. Zgurovsky and Y. Lyubonenko Vice 
Prime Ministers, F. Yaroshenko – Minister of Finance and T. Vasadze – Minister of Transport. 
Meanwhile, it is unclear whether the matter concerns the substitution of officials or the introduction of 
additional offices of Vice Prime Ministers, what their area of competence will be and what needs to 
determine it. The identical Cabinet resolution of 25 June mentioned the office of the Minister of Justice, 
which was deleted in the October version of the document notwithstanding the draft resolution on the 
dismissal of Minister of Justice M. Onyshchuk registered on 1 June. On 25 June, the cabinet made a 
proposal to appoint O. Klymenko the Minister of Coal Industry. Hence, it is possible to conclude that 
public processes of nominating potential candidates for government offices and discussion of their 
business qualities and political platforms, which, given the absence of a basic document on policy 
development, the Government Action Program, creates additional risks for the decision-making system 
and the assessment of vectors of interparty and intergroup agreements.  
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IMPACT OF POLITICAL CORRUPTION ON THE BUSINESS CLIMATE  
 
International organizations and institutions that study corruption and develop anti-corruption 
mechanisms, the World Bank, the Transparency International and the Council of Europe (the UPAC 
Project: Support to Good Governance: Project against Corruption in Ukraine), concentrate on certain 
sectors of political corruption. Specifically, the World Bank researches the impact of corruption in private 
corporations on the system of government, while the Project of the Council of Europe is focused on the 
proper administration of procedures.  
In the WB report, a measure of corruption is the impact of state capture on individual firms. In countries 
like Ukraine, state capture can be extremely pernicious to an economy and society because it can 
fundamentally and permanently distort the “rules of the game” in favor of a few privileged insiders. 
(Though, as earlier, the issues of the essence of political transition of the post-Soviet states, whether they 
could be referred to transitional economies and whether other conceptual approaches should be applied 
to changes in political processes in the countries like Ukraine remain open.) Another feature that 
characterizes the WB approach to corruption is linked to the identification of the subject of corruption. It 
is economic entities interested in state capture and administrative corruption. (Conversely, this 
Document on Political Risk Assessment surveys political corruption and relations that help illegitimately 
enhance political positions of individuals contrary to social and, sometimes, national interests.)  
In its survey on corruption, the World Bank uses the concept of state capture, which focuses on the 
impact of private firms on the formulation and content of laws and regulations.13 Under the survey, 
“State capture refers to the actions of individuals, groups or firms both in the public and private sectors 
to influence the formation of laws, regulations, decrees and other government policies to their own 
advantage as a result of the illicit and non-transparent provision of private benefits to public officials. 
There are many different forms of this problem. Distinctions can be drawn between types of institutions 
subject to capture, the legislator, the executive, the judiciary or regulatory agencies, and types of actors 
engaged in capture, private firms, political leaders or narrow interest groups. Yet, all form of state 
capture are directed toward extracting rents from the state for a narrow range of individuals, firms or 
sectors through distorting the basic legal and regulatory framework with potentially enormous losses for 
the society at large. They thrive, where economic power is highly concentrated, countervailing social 
interests are weak and formal channels of political influence and interest intermediation are 
underdeveloped.”14  
The survey identified a number of specific activities that fall within the definition for state capture, 
including: the “sale” of parliamentary votes and presidential decrees to private interests; the sale of civil 
and criminal court decisions to private interests; corrupt mishandling of central bank funds; and illegal 
contributions by private actors to political parties.15 Though soon, the essence of state capture was 
limited to the two key parameters: bribes to parliamentarians (the impact on the process and content of 
law-making) and government officials (the impact on the process of decision implementation).  
The provision of the WB last survey of 2006 that state capture “can have pernicious effects on economic 
competition by restricting market entry and distributing economic preferences to influential elites”16, 
“privileged insiders”, proves to be true for Ukraine (a good example is privatization in the interests of 
individual buyers). Corruption shifts from economy to politics and, in its turn, affects the former. By 
                                                            
13 James H. Anderson, Cheryl W. Grey, WB Survey on Anticorruption in Transition 3 Who is Succeeding… and Why? – 
Washington, 2006. P. 17 
14 Anticorruption in Transition: A Contribution to the Policy Debate. – Washington, 2000. P. 15 
15 The same source, p. 16 
16James H. Anderson, Cheryl W. Grey, WB Survey on Anticorruption in Transition 3 Who is Succeeding… and Why? – 
Washington, 2006. P. 10 
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creating unequal conditions for different economic entities, political corruption adversely 
affects the business climate.  
Businessmen believe the instable legislation, corruption and the political instability to be the main 
obstacles to the conduct of business. The fourth factor is unequal competition terms. Corruption is a 
reason for the instable legislation (which allows authorities at a variety of levels to exercise their powers 
“manually”) and for unequal competition terms (the “green light” to bribe-givers and the “red light” to 
other businessmen).  
The regulatory environment is one of the most important components of the investment climate and, 
probably, the most decisive for the development of investment activities at the city level. Yet at the same 
time, it is the most corrupt.  
In general, the regulatory environment is characterized by the following parameters: 
• Level of clarity and consistency of the government regulatory policy 
• Impact on the investor by different national authorities (registration, licensing, certification etc.)  
• Level of bureaucracy and corruption. 
The clarity and consistency of the government regulatory policy is manifested through the capacity of 
power to set equal, firm and understandable for businessmen rules of communication with a regulatory 
body starting with the registration of business up to its closure.  
Notwithstanding the simplified registration of economic entities in Ukraine, procedures for conduct of 
business are complicated and time-consuming. The administrative interference with the business 
through making unjustified barriers and obstacle is still the reality. For the investor, this means 
additional expenses and risks and an almost guaranteed loss of invested money, if a system of protection 
against such interference is absent. The investor may get a kind of an “insurance policy” through corrupt 
ties with national and/or local authorities in the person of their authorized officials. Hence, expenditures 
for corrupt payments (bribes) become an essential addition to money invested. This surely does not favor 
the attraction of investment. 
Corruption that attends the conduct of business in Ukraine is manifested in two ways: through the 
collection of the so-called administrative rent by some government officials and the purchase of seats in 
authorities by representatives of the private business to ensure competitive advantages for their 
companies. 
The administrative rent problem is closely linked to a relatively low salary of average government 
officials and the deficient and complex law, which gives an impetus to everyday corruption.  
The dependence of permissive, control and advisory, information and consulting actions of authorities 
upon an individual official, the dominance of private and sole decision-making methods in 
administrative governance procedures instead of systemic administrative ones, the lack of openness, 
public accountability and controllability of specific officials – all these created favorable conditions for 
the retention ad spread of corruption in relations of citizens and power.  
The practice confirms the following regularity: the more difficult the regulatory environment is for the 
conduct of business at the national and regional levels (permissive, coordinating, customs, tax, land use 
and rent procedures), the more opportunities government officials have to extort money in different 
ways and to commit corrupt offences.  
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However, the fight against corruption of some officials is a matter of law-enforcement agencies. And 
their capacity to combat it is the topic of a special discussion. It is much more difficult to counteract the 
purchase of seats in authorities by representatives of the private business. National and local 
businessmen place their protégés to authorities to get preferences for their companies, which has the 
harmful effect on the free competition, which, in its turn, leads to the distorted distribution and 
redistribution of markets for goods, services and capital.  
The main thing is that these entail the system distortion of government institutions, which hampers the 
strengthening of their role in the socio-economic development of the state.  
Despite local authorities have to positively affect the creation of acceptable conditions for the conduct of 
business, they often interpret this as active counteraction to the advent of “outside” investors to a 
city/region. In such the situation, even the consent of an investor to pay for loyalty of authorities may be 
insufficient. As a result, volumes of attracted investment resources, often pivotal for structural changes 
and the regional development on the whole, remain minor. 
Corruption as a result of the collusion of power and the business remains the main system barrier to the 
development of the small business despite the gradual establishment of its infrastructure, the growth of 
budget receipts from it and the deeper understanding of the importance of its role by the society and 
authorities.  
Taking into account the fact that the small business is actually deprived of the opportunity to represent 
and lobby its interests in authorities at a variety of levels, the problem of the contradictoriness of the 
socio-economic magnitude and the weak economic viability of this economic segment is still unsolved. 
Left face to face with the official, the small business entity must survive (overcome numerous challenges 
and structural barriers) by means of going into the shadow, i.e. by means of corrupting opportunities to 
work and exist for a while. This leads to the crisis of the mass consciousness and behavior, which spreads 
to all social areas.  
Hence, only the formulation of effective laws aimed to gradually oust corruption from all spheres of the 
social life will make it possible to radically change terms of business so that to decrease corruption risks.  
 
THE UKRAINIAN STATE AGAINST CORRUPTION  
 
With the support of the World Bank, the Council of Europe, the GRECO and the OECD, Ukraine takes 
anti-corruption actions. Six blocks of anti-corruption initiatives, suggested by the President of Ukraine in 
2008, are being gradually put into practice. The counteraction to political corruption shall be based on 
the application of transparent procedures in all social areas.  
 
The bills “On the Conflict of Interests in the Work of Government Officials”, “On Actions of Government 
Financial Control of the Public Service” and “On Lobbying” are under consideration of parliament. 
 
The government is drafting bills, which might serve as an essential factor in the reduction of corruption 
risks in decision-making, if enacted and complied with. Specifically, the matter concerns the 
Methodology for the Anti-Corruption Examination of Draft Normative and Legal Acts 
endorsed by the Cabinet resolution of 16 September, 2009 (not in force yet). The document governs, 
“Major objectives of the anti-corruption examination shall be to identify the availability/absence of 
corruption factors, i.e. the body of rules that stimulate or might stimulate the commitment of corrupt 
violations ad to make recommendations for their elimination.” According to the Methodology, “Draft 
normative and legal acts with potentially high corruption risks shall be understood as bills regulating: 
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relations linked to the implementation of decisions, including individual ones; the determination of 
human and civil rights, freedoms and duties and methods for their exercise; management of state-owned 
or communal property and its alienation; issues of customs, tax and financial policies; the setting of 
tender and auction procedures for the alienation/purchase of goods, woks and services; issues of the 
investment and innovation activity; services and privileges to be rendered to certain categories of 
economic entities; the setting of powers of executive authorities and local self-government bodies and 
their officials, in particular the permission to independently determine a procedure/mechanism to solve 
problematic issues; the delegation of powers of executive authorities and local self-government bodies to 
enterprises and organizations, irrespective of their form of property; administrative services to be 
rendered to executive authorities, local self-government bodies and their officials; and the exercise of 
control and advisory functions by executive authorities, local self-government bodies and their officials.” 
The term of the anti-corruption examination may not exceed 15 days after a bill was forwarded to an 
authorized representative of the government responsible for the anti-corruption policy. Results of the 
anti-corruption examination shall be made public on the government site within 15 days after the 
passage (approval) of the said bill, save bills containing information, access to which is restricted, or 
which pertains to the state secret.  
 
An authorized representative of the government responsible for the anti-corruption policy is a new 
institution that shall formulate and implement government policy in this area acting on the basis of a 
respective resolution approved by the Cabinet resolution of 24 April, 2009. 
Another novelty is the launch of a project on the establishment of internal control services at 
national and local executive authorities. A respective Cabinet draft resolution reads, “It is 
suggested to set up, at national executive authorities and regional state administrations, independent 
subdivisions tasked to prevent, to detect and to take actions to put an end to corrupt offences and 
corruption in executive authorities and, respectively, in subordinated (controlled) agencies; to promptly 
respond citizen applications on facts of corrupt offences; to exercise internal control of the compliance 
with the anti-corruption law, the purpose and effective use of budget funds and the organization of 
government purchases; to carry out the analytical, organizational, advisory and explanatory work in 
executive authorities; and to resolve the conflict of interests of government officials.”  
 
Corruption shall be combated not only by repressive actions against some “corrupt 
officials” but also at the institutional level. Only a shift to system reforms could be a 
driving force for change in socio-political relations, ensure conditions for democratic 
governance and the proper performance of its functions by the government.  
 
Experts surveyed by the UCIPR (see materials of the expert survey on “Impact of Political 
Corruption…”, pp. 9-10) are rather optimistic about an opportunity to minimize corruption 
relations and networks up to the limit, when political corruption loses its system 
nature and ceases to destroy democratic procedures and to weaken power 
institutions.  
80% of respondents guess to prevent the irrevocability of relations of political corruption, which 
stimulate corruption in other social areas, the government needs to regularly develop procedures 
legitimating power and governance in the framework of governmental institutions on the basis of 
transparent mechanisms, in particular:  
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- Carry out system and comprehensive reforms in all areas of the public policy, regulate 
procedures and mechanisms for lobbying legitimate political, socio-economic and other interests 
in electoral authorities, in particular local self-government bodies  
 
- Launch transparent mechanisms in the use of public (budget) funds, especially in electoral 
campaigns (76%); put government funding for parties into practice and limit opportunities of 
private funding for parties and electoral campaigns. The correction of the electoral model on the 
basis of its openness and opportunities for citizens to elect and to be elected shall decrease 
manifestations of clientele relations in party and political relations  
 
- Remove, to the maximum possible extent, corruption risks from the area of administrative 
services and launch electronic regulation to limit contacts with officials  
 
- Launch the mandatory check-up, by law-enforcement agencies, of information made public in 
the media about facts of political corruption, respond them according to procedures established 
by the law and effectively control the compliance with rules of the anti-corruption law.  
 
 
DEGREE AND STRUCTURE OF POLITICAL RISKS 
 
 
Assessment of decision-making procedures and analysis of positions of active economic agents in the 
system of political representation (the political decision-making process) allows assessing the degree of 
political risks in Ukraine at the current stage (October-December 2009) at the level of 6-7 points.  
 
7 – Unpredictability is high.  
• Regional instability, inclusion of the country into the zone of conflict of interests  
• Polarized politics 
• High level of the “human factor” in decision-making 
• Instable political ties 
• Voluntarism in decision-making 
• Closed decision-making in the interests of decision-making parties 
• Disregard of procedures and the need for their recognition 
• Unpredictable decisions 
• Interference of the government with corporations and high level of corruption. 
 
6 – Unpredictability is higher than average.  
• Polarized politics  
• High level of the “human factor” in decision-making 
• Voluntarism in decision-making  
• Closed decision-making in the interests of decision-making parties  
• Disregard of procedures and the need for their recognition  
• Unpredictable decisions, interference of the government with corporations  
• High level of corruption. 
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INFORMATION ABOUT THE UCIPR PROJECT ON POLITICAL RISK ASSESSMENT  
 
 
 
In 2008, having many-year experience of analysis of political processes and activity of political 
system institutions, the Ukrainian Center for Political Research launched a new project linked to 
the identification of factors of political risks in Ukraine. 
In the context of goals of this project, a political risk means tendencies that provoke uncertainty 
in the process of political and governmental decision-making and impede planning of actions on 
the country’s markets. Political risks grow from political relations, i.e. relation concerning power 
and property, lie in the area of political decision-making and influence positions of agents in 
other areas. The term “political risk” does not coincide, by its volume, with the term “political 
stability” and concerns action/inaction of the government that rapidly changes conditions of 
work of economic agents on markets and adversely affects positions of different social groups. 
Political instability is viewed as an element of the structure of political risks.  
The project objective: to forecast, on a basis of political risk assessment in Ukraine, a probability 
of the retention of their impact in the short- and medium-term period.  
The subject: to evaluate the placing and correlation of groups of political influence both inside 
and outside the country and to analyze proposals of these groups. 
The methodology: expert polling (questionnaire poll) concerning assessment of impact of the 
determined factors, monitoring of decisions and draft decisions of national authorities in 
Ukraine and abroad (that relate to Ukraine), monitoring of decision-making procedures and 
assessment of positions of groups of political influence.  
Assessments are regularly revised. 
The project is implemented by the UCIPR Politics Division.  
Division Head – Svitlana Kononchuk; Project Expert – Ihor Nemchynov, Candidate of 
Philosophy. 
Expert survey – Svitlana Gorobchyshyna. 
